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Governmental influences on drug develop-
ment can be positive. In the United States, 
the research funded by the federal govern-
ment (primarily the National Institutes 
of Health but also the National Science 
Foundation and several others) that attempts 
to better understand fundamental processes 
and to establish ‘proof of concept’ often pro-
vides the scientific substrate that is essential 
to downstream product development. For 
example, recombinant DNA technology, 
which is now ubiquitous in basic research 
and drug discovery, was the product 
of synergistic advances in several areas of 
government-funded research, including 
enzymology, microbial genetics and 
physiology, and separation technologies. 
The National Institutes of Health also 
carries out some clinical trials, and even 
occasionally undertakes early research and 
development on a drug (examples include 
paclitaxel, the anticancer drug, and erythro-
poietin, which stimulates the bone marrow 
to produce red blood cells and is used to 
treat certain anaemias). And as a repository 
of safety data on all drugs, the US Food 
and Drug Administration (FDA) possesses 
information that no other organization com-
mands, which it can make available to health 
practitioners and the public. In addition, 
recent research-orientated initiatives from the 
FDA, such as the Critical Path Initiative, have 
the potential to help to address industry-wide 
issues, such as the need for better animal 
models of human disease and for biomarkers 
of drug efficacy and toxicity.
However, by imposing policies that can 
unduly hamper innovation, governmental 
actions can exert a significantly negative 
influence on drug development. Policies that 
will affect drug pricing and drug regulation 
are currently the subject of considerable 
debate in the United States and elsewhere, 
and there is growing momentum for gov-
ernmental actions to address the perceived 
problems in these areas. On the one hand, 
as a result of concerns about the rapid 
growth in health-care spending, efforts to 
contain the prices of new drugs (which in 
many countries are set by the government) 
are attracting increasing attention in the 
United States, which has long resisted such 
controls. On the other hand, high-profile 
problems (or alleged problems) of drug 
safety have led to calls to increase the 
stringency of drug regulation, which would 
increase the already astronomical costs to 
drug developers to bring a drug to market; 
and that would, in turn, raise the prices that 
would need to be charged to payers for the 
developer merely to recoup the investment 
made in drug discovery and development.
Both aspects of public policy are the 
focus of bills that are currently under 
discussion by the US Congress (BOX 1). 
As discussed below, some previous interven-
tions of the US Congress have impeded 
new drug discovery and development, and 
have created uncertainty and confusion 
— a situation that is anathema to corporate 
planning of this lengthy and risky process. 
With this in mind, we discuss the role of 
governmental influences in drug discovery 
and development, highlight the factors 
that should be considered in order to avoid 
governmental interventions that negatively 
affect pharmaceutical innovation, and 
suggest how reforms could help to improve 
the status quo.
Price controls
There is considerable evidence that drugs 
often improve the span and quality of life 
in a remarkably cost-effective way. This is 
of crucial significance not only to the indi-
vidual patient but to society as a whole: the 
responsible use of drug therapies lowers the 
total cost of health care. For example, a study 
by three leading health economists for the 
National Bureau of Economic Research in 
the United States found that the overall cost 
of therapy for heart attacks and depression 
— both of which are commonly treated with 
drugs — actually declined by an average 
of 1% each year from 1984 to 1991 (REF. 1). 
Similarly, the costs of treatment per episode 
of major depression fell by 25% from 1991 to 
1995 (REF. 2), and studies of the impacts of 
a thrombolytic drug in stroke patients3 and a 
new drug for migraine headaches4 show that 
these treatments are highly cost-effective. 
Furthermore, new drugs typically confer 
an advantage over older ones in reducing 
mortality. According to a study of patients 
who took drugs at any time between January 
and June 2000, those who took newer 
medications were less likely to die by the 
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end of 2002. The estimated mortality rates 
were directly related to the time that had 
elapsed since the approval of the drugs. For 
pre-1970 drugs, the estimated mortality 
rate was 4.4%, whereas the mortality rates 
for drugs approved during the 1970s, 1980s 
and 1990s were 3.6%, 3.0% and 2.5%, in 
corresponding order5.
Although such studies provide evidence 
for the health benefits and cost-effectiveness 
of the introduction of new drug therapies, 
there are now increasing efforts to control 
the prices of drugs in the United States, 
which, unlike Japan and Europe, for the 
most part has eschewed such controls. It 
is therefore notable that some researchers 
have argued that even in the United States, 
the impacts of price control efforts have 
been significant nevertheless. For example, 
a group at the Center for Healthcare and 
Insurance Studies at the University of 
Connecticut reported that prices fall as the 
government’s share of spending on drugs 
increases, and that this exerts a negative 
effect on innovation and, ultimately, on 
public health6. They studied US data from 
1960 to 2001 and found that, owing to the 
influence of laws intended to curb drug 
prices under government-run programmes, 
“from 1992 to 2001 a 10 percent increase in 
the growth of government’s share of total 
spending on pharmaceuticals was associated 
with a 6.7 percent annual reduction in the 
growth of pharmaceutical prices.”6 When the 
government increases its share of spending, 
argue these researchers, pharmaceutical 
companies considering an investment in the 
development of new drugs can look forward 
to lower revenues, and this reduces their 
incentive to innovate.
Using regression analysis, they con-
cluded that in the absence of any govern-
mental influence exerted on drug prices, 
prices would have been about 35% higher, 
and that the “government-induced loss of 
capitalized pharmaceutical R&D expen-
ditures was $188 billion (in 2000 dollars) 
from 1960 to 2001”. Applying econometric 
models on the productivity of pharmaceuti-
cal R&D in the United States over the same 
period, they translated this foregone R&D 
into 140 million human life-years lost as 
the result of increased pain and suffering 
and lives shortened by the absence of new 
medicines. This was equivalent to more 
than half a year of life lost per person in the 
United States at the time.
Notwithstanding such findings, the 
Democrats who now control Congress 
want to change the Medicare drug benefit 
to require government officials to negotiate 
drug prices with the pharmaceutical com-
panies — which amounts to price controls. 
(Under the current programme, competing 
insurance companies individually negotiate 
the deals and offer coverage to the retired 
and disabled.) Could anyone think that the 
government using its monopolistic muscle 
to force drug prices to sub-market levels will 
stimulate drug companies to develop more 
life-saving drugs?
The precedent of the Veterans 
Administration health-care system suggests 
that another likely outcome of such com-
pulsory negotiations will be that the govern-
ment will decide not to cover certain drugs 
under Medicare at all. Only 19% of drugs 
approved by the FDA since 2000 are listed 
on the Veterans Administration formulary, 
and less than 40% of drugs approved in the 
1990s are listed.
The FDA’s influence
Although there are other governmental 
influences on pharmaceutical development 
in the United States, regulation by the FDA 
is certainly the most potent and has long 
been a major focus of attention, analysis 
and criticism. Over the past several decades, 
the pendulum has swung over what ails 
pharmaceutical regulation. Thirty years ago, 
the concerns were primarily about ‘drug lag’ 
— slow reviews and approvals by the FDA 
that put Americans at a disadvantage to 
consumers in other countries; but, in recent 
years, concern has shifted primarily to what 
might be called ‘drug leap’ — allegations of 
hurried approvals, insufficient attention paid 
to drug safety, and too close a relationship 
between regulators and industry. Several 
highly publicized events have heightened 
public concern about drug safety during 
the past few years: inadequate warnings on 
the labels of anti-depressants, the discovery 
of previously unknown adverse reactions 
to non-steroidal anti-inflammatory drugs 
(NSAIDS) and the multiple sclerosis drug  
natalizumab (Tysabri; Biogen-Idec), and 
the dramatic decompensation of volunteers 
almost immediately after receiving the first 
dose of a drug (TGN1412) in a Phase I trial 
in England.
However, contrary to these percep-
tions, drug regulation in the United 
States in recent years has actually become 
progressively more risk-averse, which has 
profoundly affected corporate strategies for 
drug discovery and development, the rate at 
which new drugs appear in the marketplace 
and patients’ access to them (see REFS 7,8 
for further discussion of this topic). Indeed, 
Box 1 | Upcoming congressional bills
Enzi–Kennedy Bill, Enhancing Drug Safety and Innovation Act of 2007, S. 484:
• A bill proposed to the US Senate
• Provides additional resources for the US Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA) drug safety 
office and makes it organizationally independent of the FDA’s drug-approval function
• Enables the FDA to require clinical trials
• Requires drug approvals to be accompanied by post-marketing risk evaluation and mitigation 
strategies (REMS) that are intended to help companies and regulators to assess post-marketing 
adverse-event reports and to communicate risk information to the public; REMS could include 
mandatory post-marketing safety studies, restrictions on which providers can prescribe or 
dispense a drug and limitations on direct-to-consumer advertising
• REMS may require drug companies to develop medication guidelines for distribution when 
a drug is dispensed, patient package inserts, and plans for disseminating risk information to 
health-care providers
• Under REMS, pharmaceutical companies may also be required to conduct post-marketing 
(Phase IV) trials
• Creates an institute that would identify new tools for biomedical research
• Requires all clinical trials to be registered and their results stored in a public database
Waxman–Markey Bill, Enhancing Drug Safety and Innovation Act of 2007, H.R. 1561:
• The companion bill to the Senate’s Enzi–Kennedy Bill (S. 484), with similar provisions, proposed 
to the US House of Representatives
Dodd–Grassley Bill, Fair Access to Clinical Trials Act, S. 467:
• A bill proposed to the US Senate
• Gives the FDA more power to require manufacturers to conduct post-marketing surveillance 
and other measures that are related to the safety of newly approved drugs
• Creates a new organizational entity within the FDA to oversee post-approval drug safety that 
would report directly to the FDA commissioner
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recent criticism from Congress, the media 
and others regarding drug safety has caused 
an already risk-averse agency to become 
even more conservative and defensive in 
its decision-making. In September 2006, 
Genentech announced that approval of its 
colon cancer drug bevacizumab (Avastin) 
for breast cancer would be delayed by at 
least a year because of requests from the 
FDA for additional data. The company said 
that regulators appeared to be increasing 
the stringency of requirements for certain 
types of clinical trials and had arbitrarily 
demanded that its trials be “audited and 
summarized” in a way that was different 
from an earlier agreement with regulators9.
Regulators moving the goalposts in the 
middle of the game is particularly vexing 
for drug developers, and the example with 
bevacizumab is not an isolated case. Another 
recent and particularly problematic example 
involves Somaxon Pharmaceuticals testing 
an already approved drug, doxepin, for a 
new indication. The drug, approved for the 
treatment of depression since 1969, is being 
tested in very low doses for use as a sleeping 
pill. The FDA initially assured the company 
that it could begin human clinical trials 
without first doing animal tests because of 
doxepin’s long history of use in people and 
because Somaxon was using only about 
1–8% of the dose used to treat depression10. 
However, in May 2006, after having com-
pleted several clinical trials, representatives 
from Somaxon met with the FDA to discuss 
the submission of a new drug application, 
and regulators unexpectedly asked for a 
full battery of testing in animals, which will 
delay the company’s application by at least 
6 months10. Animal testing is usually con-
sidered to be ‘preclinical’, so it is difficult to 
understand the logic of animal testing for an 
almost 40-year-old drug that is undergoing 
trials for a new indication, and at a far lower 
dose than it is normally used.
In addition, a number of drugs previously 
granted marketing approval in Europe have 
received ‘approvable’, instead of approval, 
letters from the FDA, meaning that addi-
tional data are required before the drug can 
be marketed. These include Sanofi-Aventis’s 
rimonabant (Acomplia) for weight loss and 
cessation of smoking, NPS Pharmaceuticals’  
recombinant parathyroid hormone 
(Preos) for osteoporosis, and Encysive 
Pharmaceuticals’ sitaxsentan (Thelin) for 
pulmonary hypertension.
A further sign of greater risk aversion is 
the increasingly aggressive use by regulators 
of post-marketing ‘risk minimization action 
plans’ (RiskMAPs). These RiskMAPs can 
include the submission of additional safety 
information, including larger safety studies 
to screen earlier for relatively rare potential 
adverse reactions, greater restrictions on 
distribution and advertising, and so on. In 
March 2005, for example, the RiskMAP 
that accompanied the FDA’s approval of 
the diabetes drug pramlintide (Symlin; 
Amylin) prohibited the company from con-
ducting any direct-to-consumer advertising 
or journal advertising for 1 year following 
approval, and also restricted promotion 
primarily to physicians who specialize 
in diabetes management and who are 
supported by certified diabetes educators. 
Brown and Johnson argued persuasively in 
a 2006 Washington Legal Foundation ‘Legal 
Backgrounder’ that this kind of regulatory 
expansionism is unwise, outside FDA’s 
statutory authority and unconstitutional. 
They characterized the FDA’s ban on adver-
tising as “nothing more than an effort that 
seeks to keep people in the dark for what 
the government perceives to be their own 
good — a concept the Supreme Court has 
warned courts to view with skepticism.”11 
Moreover, they point out that the FDA’s ban 
on advertising Symlin conflicts with the 
FDA’s own guidance to industry, in which 
the FDA cited “promotional techniques 
such as direct-to-consumer advertising 
highlighting appropriate patient use or 
product risks” as an example of how to use 
a RiskMAP12.
This sort of inconsistency from the 
FDA, which is particularly problematic for 
companies that have invested substantial 
sums in R&D, is not uncommon. Regulators’ 
recent actions on the post-approval risk 
management of two drugs, natalizumab 
and rituximab (Rituxan; Genentech/Biogen 
Idec), are illustrative.
In late 2004, natalizumab was approved 
for multiple sclerosis, a common and 
debilitating autoimmune disease that 
affects the central nervous system. The 
testing of the drug in clinical trials yielded 
impressive results — the frequency of clinical 
relapses was reduced by more than half 
— and led the FDA to grant accelerated 
approval. In early 2005, however, with several 
thousand patients already being treated 
with natalizumab, it was discovered that 
three had contracted progressive multifocal 
leukoencephalopathy (PML), a rare and 
often fatal neurological disorder caused by 
a virus. (Because the drug suppresses certain 
components of the immune response, 
regulators, clinicians and the product’s 
developers were sensitive from the begin-
ning to the possibility of infections as a 
side effect.) Immediately, the manufactur-
ers voluntarily halted production and 
distribution and withdrew natalizumab 
from the market. After the analysis of new 
safety data, an FDA advisory committee 
recommended natalizumab’s return to the 
market with revised labelling, but the FDA 
went far beyond adding more prominent 
warnings about the drug’s side effects to 
the labelling (which would arguably have 
been sufficient) and insisted instead on a 
complex RiskMAP that imposes onerous 
restrictions on the use of natalizumab. 
They include limited distribution and addi-
tional education and monitoring require-
ments for patients, prescribers, pharmacies 
and infusion centres.
Like natalizumab, rituximab, a treatment 
for rheumatoid arthritis and certain kinds of 
lymphomas, acts by suppressing elements 
of the immune system and has also been 
linked to PML; there have been 23 con-
firmed cases of PML in patients receiving 
rituximab for the approved indication of 
non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma and, most recently, 
2 cases in patients being treated experimen-
tally for systemic lupus erythematosus. But, 
in contrast to natalizumab, rituximab has 
never been subject to a RiskMAP. And in 
spite of the new cases of PML in patients 
with systemic lupus erythematosus — and 
the fact that rituximab also is under consid-
eration for treatment of multiple sclerosis 
— the FDA was content merely to update 
the package insert for rituximab. Leaving 
aside the question of whether rituximab 
should be subject to a more restrictive 
RiskMAP or whether natalizumab deserves 
a less restrictive one, the point is that the 
FDA’s inconsistency sends mixed signals and 
creates uncertainty — the bane of patients, 
physicians and drug companies alike.
The Institute of Medicine and the FDA
A report focused on drug safety that was 
released in September 2006 by the US 
Institute of Medicine represents the culmina-
tion of perceptions that approaches to drug 
safety need to be fundamentally reconsid-
ered13. The report makes sweeping, radical 
recommendations for change, which in our 
opinion are not only unlikely to remedy the 
FDA’s current shortcomings, but will make 
the FDA even more risk-averse, further inflate 
the costs of drug development, discourage 
innovation, reduce the number of drugs 
emerging from the R&D pipeline, and have 
the net effect of compromising public health.
The proposed recommendations include 
what would amount to the introduction 
of only limited approvals for new drugs 
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during a lengthy period after approval 
(with special warning labels and restricted 
direct-to-consumer advertising), greater 
use of advisory committees, a new registry 
of clinical trials, and additional resources 
for the FDA.
Furthermore, under proposals for the 
disclosure of information about clinical trials 
that have come from both the Institute of 
Medicine’s report and Congress, the FDA 
would force drug developers to include details 
such as timelines, milestones and end points, 
which drug companies (and current federal 
law) consider to be sensitive, proprietary 
information. Such mandatory disclosure 
would give competitors an early look at 
sensitive data, thus expropriating from drug 
developers some of their proprietary informa-
tion. The prospect of ‘competition via forced 
disclosure’ would further reduce the incentive 
to develop new drugs.
The FDA had anticipated the calls for 
reform with initiatives of its own to increase 
the surveillance and reporting on the safety 
of drugs. These include the creation of a 
Drug Safety Board, whose objectives are 
“to provide oversight and advice to [Center 
for Drug Evaluation and Research] leader-
ship on the management of important drug 
safety issues and to manage the flow of 
emerging safety information to healthcare 
professionals and patients”14, and a number 
of projects under the remit of the Critical 
Path Initiative. These projects include much 
needed improvements in the FDA’s Adverse 
Event Reporting System and research on 
animal models for human disease, cardio-
vascular biomarkers and the genetic basis 
of adverse events. 
Other initiatives, such as the FDA’s Drug 
Watch Program, appear to have more to do 
with public relations than public health. In 
May 2005, the FDA published draft guidance 
on the Drug Watch Program, which will 
make ‘emerging safety information’ publicly 
available. According to the FDA15, the Drug 
Watch Program:
…is intended to identify drugs for 
which FDA is actively evaluating early 
safety signals. The Drug Watch is not 
intended to be a list of drugs that are 
particularly risky or dangerous for use; 
listing of a drug on Drug Watch should 
not be construed as a statement by FDA 
that the drug is dangerous or that it is 
inappropriate for use. Rather, inclusion 
on the Drug Watch signifies that FDA 
is attempting to assess the meaning and 
potential consequences of emerging 
safety information.
The FDA further notes in the same 
document that the Drug Watch Program 
is intended:
…to share emerging safety information 
before we have fully determined its 
significance or taken final regulatory 
action so that patients and healthcare 
professionals will have the most current 
information concerning the potential 
risks and benefits of a marketed drug 
product upon which to make individual 
treatment choices.
It is difficult to predict what physicians 
and other health-care providers — let alone 
members of the public — will do with such 
preliminary data, which are available on 
the FDA’s web site. There is a difference 
between indiscriminate data and useful 
information, and the Drug Watch Program 
seems destined to provide far more of the 
former than the latter. Then-FDA Deputy 
Commissioner Scott Gottlieb addressed that 
point: “Information that could influence 
clinical medical practice needs to be made 
available more quickly, and more widely, 
after it has gone through a deliberative 
scientific process that firms up its meaning 
and the magnitude and the veracity of its 
conclusions.”16 But Gottlieb himself 
characterized the information that would 
appear on Drug Watch as data that are 
“still un-scrubbed by scientific rigor.”
Moreover, given the current desire at the 
FDA for ways to demonstrate a commit-
ment to drug safety, and the difficulty of 
proving a negative, how will a ‘suspect’ drug 
ever be able to clear its name and get off 
the Drug Watch list? Surely, it would be far 
more constructive to update product label-
ling continuously and rapidly — which can 
now be accomplished using the FDA’s web 
site and e-mails to health-care providers 
and consumers — once regulators are past 
the stage of merely “attempting to assess 
the meaning and potential consequences 
of emerging safety information,” and have 
actually “determined the significance” of 
the information.
In January 2007, the FDA announced a 
plan to carry out a comprehensive assess-
ment of the safety of some new drugs within 
18 months of their introduction, and to 
issue a ‘report card’ on their performance. 
Although this may sound plausible, it 
appears to be inconsistent with the data 
cited above which show that in fact newer 
drugs confer an advantage over older ones 
in reducing mortality. And in February 
2007, in reaction — many observers would 
say overreaction — to proposed legislation, 
the FDA introduced new restrictions on 
members of advisory committees, which are 
composed of outside experts. Committee 
members who receive money from a drug or 
device maker would be barred for the first 
time from voting on whether to approve that 
company’s products; and if they receive more 
than $50,000 from a company or a competi-
tor whose product is being discussed, they 
would no longer be allowed to serve on 
the committees. This eliminates precisely 
those experts who are likely to possess the 
greatest expertise about the subjects under 
discussion; disclosure of potential conflicts 
of interests and recusal when appropriate 
would have been far better than the new, 
rigid, one-size-fits-all automatic exclusions 
and disqualifications.
Congressional confusion
Over the past few years, Congress has 
weighed in with a variety of proposals that 
were supposedly intended to enhance drug 
safety, including the creation of an inde-
pendent agency concerned specifically with 
drug safety. Most of these proposals were 
ill-conceived.
An agency concerned only with drug 
safety would place us in the realm of regu-
lating according to the bogus ‘precautionary 
principle’, which erects high barriers to new 
products, processes and technologies, what-
ever their potential benefits. Were this new 
agency to be created, it would effectively 
create within the FDA an anti-drug entity 
with strong incentives to argue for the non-
approval or withdrawal from the market 
of drugs that have significant side effects 
even if they offer huge net benefits. (We 
have seen this already from certain factions 
within the FDA.) At the least, the net effect 
would be to make the FDA’s drug evaluators 
even more defensive and risk-averse. Fewer 
drugs would be approved and more would 
be subject to dubious withdrawals from the 
market; and with these increases in develop-
ment ‘failures’, the average cost to bring a 
new drug to market would rise even further, 
diminishing the robustness of the drug 
development pipeline.
Congressional meddling in the conduct 
of clinical trials has been particularly 
ill-advised. For example, in response to 
a long history of less representation of 
women and minorities in clinical trials 
(often for good reason, such as a reluctance 
to expose women of childbearing age to 
experimental drugs), Congress passed a law 
in 1993 requiring their inclusion in federally 
funded clinical trials in numbers that are 
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“sufficient to provide for a valid analysis 
of any differences … in response to drugs, 
therapies and treatments.”17 If this were 
enforced strictly, it could raise the numbers 
of subjects in clinical trials — and the 
attendant costs — substantially. Moreover, 
although one-size-fits-all requirements of 
that kind might seem to offer clarity, they 
are fraught with all sorts of challenges, such 
as whether every minority group must be 
represented. Although regulators have not 
enforced such quotas, their enshrinement in 
law remains a concern. The strict interpreta-
tion of legislation does not always permit 
the interposition of common sense, and the 
requirements could easily be enforced in the 
future as the result of litigation or congres-
sional oversight hearings.
What is the price of safety?
Defenders of the present, risk-averse system 
argue that lower efficiency is the price of 
safety. But this is a false trade-off. High 
standards of safety and greater efficiency 
could be achieved if we were to reform 
fundamentally the way drugs are regulated. 
If we could end regulatory excesses 
(especially those that are politically driven) 
and introduce competition into regulatory 
oversight, more patients would benefit from 
the greater number of drugs made available 
to them in a timelier way (for further 
discussion of this proposal, see REFS 7,8).
Indeed, in contrast to the perception 
that speedy reviews compromise drug 
safety, a recent study of the effects of the 
Prescription Drug User Free Act (PDUFA) 
— which requires drug sponsors to pay fees 
to the FDA for the timely review of new 
drug applications (NDAs) — not only indi-
cates that is this not the case, but provides 
evidence of the benefits of rapid reviews to 
public health. The study assessed the trade-
off between the benefits of getting ‘good’ 
drugs on the market more quickly versus 
the advantages of preventing ‘bad’ drugs 
from getting on the market18. The research-
ers estimate that by shortening the time the 
FDA took to approve drugs (by providing 
more reviewers and committing the FDA to 
certain statistical milestones), the PDUFA 
significantly improved the situation both for 
patients and for drug producers. According 
to their calculations, this benefit, or ‘social 
surplus,’ was in the range of $18–31 billion. 
Converting these economic gains into 
equivalent health benefits, they found that 
the faster access of drugs to the market 
made possible by PDUFA’s additional 
resources and reforms saved the equivalent 
of 180,000–310,000 life-years18.
The researchers also took into account 
the possibility that the faster approval 
times mean more unsafe drugs on the 
market. However, they found no statisti-
cally significant difference in the propor-
tion (2–3%) and timing of withdrawal of 
drugs that were approved before and after 
the PDUFA. To investigate further the 
relationship between faster approval times 
and drug safety, they assumed that without 
the PDUFA, none of the drugs actually 
withdrawn for safety reasons would ever 
have been allowed in the first place — a 
100% ability of regulators to detect what 
will turn out to be hazardous products. 
In other words, they used the upper bound 
on the negative impacts of the PDUFA 
caused by drugs ultimately withdrawn 
for safety reasons. Even with this extreme 
assumption, they found that 55,600 life-
years were lost owing to speedier approval, 
only 18–31% of the benefits18.
We would offer several caveats about the 
presumptive benefits of the PDUFA, which 
is still in effect and is widely expected to 
be reauthorized, with higher user fees, 
in 2007. First and foremost, the speed of 
approval measures only the relatively brief 
time span between the submission of an 
NDA or a biologics license application 
(BLA) for review and the FDA’s approval. 
However, most of the pre-approval time 
that a drug is under the FDA’s jurisdiction 
is the investigational new drug phase: the 
much longer interval between the initiation 
of clinical testing and the submission of the 
NDA or BLA, which can last for a decade 
or more. Second, given that the benefits of 
speed in the above study were measured 
relatively accurately but the costs of speed 
(that is, the benefits of slowing down) were 
explicitly overstated, a reasonable conclu-
sion is that even with the PDUFA, the time 
between the submission of the application 
and its approval is still too long. Finally, 
presumably the same benefits of more rapid 
approvals could have been obtained if the 
additional resources had been provided to 
the FDA by congressionally appropriated 
funds instead of by PDUFA user fees, which 
are nothing more than a discriminatory tax 
on a single industrial sector.
Potential for reform
Although any system of drug oversight 
should preserve a reasonable degree of 
confidence in product safety and efficacy 
for the indications listed on the label, such 
assurance can be obtained not only through 
federal regulation but also from the evolving 
interplay among industry, government, 
academia, medical practice, insurers and the 
courts. Since the current framework for the 
regulation of new drug development was 
put in place more than four decades ago, 
basic and clinical research techniques have 
advanced, the public’s sophistication and 
awareness about drugs have grown, and the 
media have become both more aggressive 
and more attuned to health issues. In addi-
tion, pharmaceutical marketing, tort case 
law and the system for cost-reimbursement 
for medical treatments have all evolved. 
These factors have altered the nature of 
manufacturer–physician–insurer–patient 
relationships profoundly and have super-
imposed new layers of scrutiny and control 
upon the FDA’s evaluation, approval and 
monitoring activities.
There are many more professional, 
full-time, career clinical researchers now 
than in the 1960s, and also more proficient, 
for-profit clinical research organizations that 
design and perform clinical studies for drug 
sponsors. In addition, there are additional 
institutional safeguards to patients, such as 
corporate procedures for carrying out and 
overseeing clinical trials and conducting 
post-marketing drug surveillance, and the 
government-mandated institutional review 
boards in clinical research institutions. 
The reporting of adverse events has been 
vastly improved, and the science of pharmaco-
epidemiology systematically examines 
adverse events in exposed populations.
But the most profound changes have 
resulted from the evolution of various 
non-governmental entities into de facto 
drug-vetting, standard-setting organiza-
tions. The newest and most potent of these 
are managed-care organizations, which 
exercise their influence through large-scale 
purchasing, construction of formularies, 
monitoring and drug use review. The 
ability of physicians who practise within 
organizations such as health-maintenance 
organizations to prescribe is increasingly 
affected and constrained by computerized 
systems that perform overall integration of 
the medical record for case management. 
A physician can be prevented from prescrib-
ing medication if, for example, according to 
computerized monitoring of their decisions, 
the drug is inconsistent with a patient’s 
The FDA could contract out 
product reviews — which has 
been highly successful in pilot 
programmes.
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listed diagnosis; excessive in dose, frequency 
or length of administration; likely to interact 
dangerously with another medication the 
patient is taking; or even judged not to be 
cost-effective compared with alternative 
drugs. Drugs can be omitted or removed 
from formularies if cheaper alternatives are 
available or if they are deemed to be non-
essential because they treat ‘non-disease’ 
conditions such as baldness or skin 
wrinkles. In short, the health-maintenance 
organization or insurer has become a third 
gatekeeper — along with the FDA and 
the prescribing physician — between the 
manufacturer and the patient.
These various influences work together 
to protect the integrity of the clinical trials 
and, after approval, to assure product 
safety, efficacy and effective post-market-
ing surveillance. The operation of these 
factors diminishes the relative importance 
of the FDA as the protector of the patient. 
But instead of a diminution of the FDA’s 
power, responsibilities and require-
ments, we have seen the opposite; and, 
as discussed in the previous section, the 
pendulum seems to be currently swinging 
even further in that direction. Regulators 
now make decisions defensively — in other 
words, to avoid approvals of harmful prod-
ucts at any cost, they tend to delay or reject 
new products. That’s bad for public health, 
for drug developers, for consumers’ free-
dom to choose and for patients’ well-being. 
The FDA is not unique in this regard. All 
regulatory agencies that perform pre-mar-
ket evaluations are subject to criticism if 
dangerous or questionable products make 
it to market (often even for products that 
offer net benefits), but actions that keep 
beneficial products from reaching consum-
ers seldom receive attention, let alone 
condemnation.
Routes to reform
Meaningful change in the United States 
will require legislative action, but recent 
congressional interest in drug regulation 
has taken the form of politically motivated 
investigations of supposed under-regulation 
or insufficient attention to product safety. 
Ironically, it is Congress’s failure to carry out 
its oversight and legislative role responsibly 
that has permitted the risk-averse culture at 
the FDA to become progressively worse and 
more entrenched. So, what could be done to 
address this situation?
As discussed above, the FDA has already 
begun to improve the post-marketing 
surveillance of adverse reactions to drugs 
but has yet to address the culture of risk 
aversion that unnecessarily delays product 
approvals. The FDA could contract out 
product reviews — which has been highly 
successful in pilot programmes19 — and the 
accumulation and analysis of safety data, 
and Congress could create extra-govern-
mental mechanisms for product oversight. 
For example, the regulation of medical 
devices (and many other consumer prod-
ucts) in the European Union relies heavily 
on product standards but normally does not 
directly involve government regulators in 
product review. For low-risk devices, manu-
facturers themselves are allowed to certify 
that their products meet the necessary 
standards. For higher-risk products, manu-
facturers must obtain third-party review 
from private-sector, profit-making entities 
(notified bodies) that test products, inspect 
manufacturing systems and ultimately verify 
that EU standards have been met20. Another 
apposite model is the Nationally Recognized 
Testing Laboratories in the United States, 
the prototype of which is Underwriters 
Laboratories, a private, non-profit entity that 
crafts standards and certifies compliance 
with them for tens of thousands of categories 
of consumer products ranging from lighting 
fixtures and flame-retardant chemicals to 
bulletproof glass.
In addition, the FDA’s senior and 
mid-level managers should be made more 
accountable — especially for scientifically 
dubious policies and needless delays in 
getting new drugs, vaccines and medical 
devices to patients who need them. One 
way to achieve that would be to create an 
independent, strong ombudsman mecha-
nism that could impose negative sanctions 
on civil servants who are incompetent, 
indolent or insubordinate. By contrast, 
all of the newly introduced checks on the 
FDA’s drug approvals — such as the Drug 
Safety Board and the Drug Watch Program 
— and more recent proposals along these 
lines are asymmetrical, in the sense that 
they primarily address narrowly defined 
concerns about safety, but do not address 
the lost benefits of drugs that are needlessly 
delayed or abandoned.
Conclusions
By means of policies that include the 
funding of research, protection of intel-
lectual property, establishment of price 
controls, and pre-market and post-approval 
regulation, governmental influences on 
the discovery, development and market-
ing of new medical devices and drugs are 
profound. Regulatory policies and decisions 
are especially potent, spelling life and death 
for patients and companies alike. Those who 
disagree with regulators’ actions are largely 
without recourse; the courts consistently 
defer to the presumed disinterested expertise 
of the regulatory agencies.
Many lives would be improved and saved 
by a more efficient system of oversight. 
Why, then, is there no sense of urgency, no 
lobbying for regulatory reform from any 
prominent quarter or interest group? The 
reasons are complex. Would-be reformers 
often are accused of being beholden to drug 
manufacturers, and of plotting to deregulate, 
which is seen as a conspiracy among politi-
cal reactionaries and free-market fanatics 
who favour commerce over the protection of 
public health. Paradoxically, even the largest 
pharmaceutical companies fail to lobby for 
reform, either individually or through their 
trade associations. How can that be?
First, drug companies continue to be 
profitable. For them, the vast expense of 
regulation is simply part of the cost of 
doing business. Their own massive regula-
tory-affairs bureaucracies are, to some 
extent, special interests convinced that they 
would not be well served by less regulation. 
Moreover, up to a certain point, excessive, 
expensive, inflexible regulation is advanta-
geous to larger companies because, owing to 
‘economies of scale’ and greater experience 
with compliance, it discriminates against 
smaller companies, which increasingly are 
the principal innovators in drug develop-
ment. Smaller companies feel the burden 
of excessive regulation (including user fees) 
and shifting goalposts more acutely and are 
more eager for regulatory change. But even 
for them regulatory reform is, at most, a 
long-term strategic goal, and they tend to be 
more concerned with day-to-day technical 
and financial crises. Individually they are 
ill-equipped — and probably ill-advised 
— to criticize and antagonize the regulators 
who have so much discretion over the test-
ing and marketing of their products. Trade 
associations are in a better position to be 
aggressive, to pressure regulators for reforms 
or other concessions (as, unlike individual 
companies, they are largely immune from 
retribution), but the two main US-based 
Reformers often are accused 
of being beholden to drug 
manufacturers, and of plotting 
to deregulate, which is seen as 
a conspiracy among political 
reactionaries and free-market 
fanatics.
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trade associations that represent pharma-
ceutical companies — the Pharmaceutical 
Research and Manufacturers of America 
(PhRMA) and the Biotechnology Industry 
Organization (BIO) — are dominated by 
large companies that are relatively content 
with the status quo.
Second, in spite of all the obstacles, 
entrepreneurial ingenuity combined with 
technological innovation continues to 
spawn new companies. Even as the industry 
has carried out a series of mergers to create 
mega-companies during the past decade, 
a wave of new start-ups has launched 
with each new technology or scientific 
breakthrough. Entrepreneurs created new 
companies to exploit recombinant DNA 
technology and hybridoma technology in 
the 1970s. More recently, they created new 
companies to take advantage of genomic, 
proteomic and metabolomic data, antisense 
technology, human gene therapy and RNA 
interference (RNAi), and to develop ‘indi-
vidualized therapies’. Because the ultimate 
rewards are potentially great, even impos-
ing regulatory obstacles cannot extinguish 
the drive to create, compete and succeed in 
this field. However, there would be more, 
and greater, successes if the regulatory 
barriers were less imposing and more 
creatively constructed.
For reasons that are equally complex and 
multi-factorial, the public are as passive as 
the drug companies about regulatory reform 
in the United States. Although they are 
literally dying for it, the ageing American 
population are not clamouring for a more 
streamlined, responsive system that will 
offer them more new drugs sooner and at 
lower cost. For one thing, few Americans 
now pay the full costs of pharmaceuticals 
out of pocket. A significant proportion of 
prescription drug costs is defrayed by some 
kind of third-party payer, usually a man-
aged-care organization, insurance company 
or the government. Therefore, individuals 
who need expensive new drugs seldom 
experience the full impact of inflated prices 
at the pharmacy.
A third factor, which affects the public’s 
view of regulation and regulatory reform, 
harkens back to the asymmetry described 
above. The public is made aware of approved 
drugs that manifest problems (or alleged 
problems) but does not know about — and 
therefore is not concerned about — drugs 
that have never been developed at all 
because of regulatory barriers to innovation.
Fourth, as far as most of the public is 
concerned, the nuances of drug development 
and its regulation are arcane and obscure. 
For example, many people assume that 
the FDA actually carries out the testing of 
pharmaceuticals, but it does not: regulators 
only evaluate data generated and submitted 
by industry. And the media have done little 
to educate them, too often evoking interest 
in regulatory affairs only during a crisis — or 
what it can portray as one.
Most importantly, at any given time, 
most Americans are healthy. They tend not, 
therefore, to pay attention to the fact that the 
quest for zero risk systematically prevents 
them from getting drugs that they might 
need in the event of injury or illness. And 
even if they were aware of this regulatory 
bottleneck, the lack of FDA and congres-
sional accountability means that they can do 
little about it. Such impotence, in turn, offers 
them little incentive to become informed 
and involved. Even the few consumers who 
have a rudimentary understanding of who 
does what, when and to whom during drug 
development tend to be fearful about new 
products. Many Americans have become 
conditioned to seek technological innova-
tion that is completely risk-free, and they 
seek someone to blame when it is not. Their 
innumeracy and lack of understanding 
about trade-offs among different sources 
of risk makes them highly susceptible to 
misleading information from those who 
regularly raise false alarms and demand that 
regulators ban, withdraw, limit and restrict 
many useful products.
These factors combine to confuse 
consumers and make them hesitant even 
to endorse, let alone demand, significant 
regulatory reform. Not realizing that there 
is a point of vanishing returns that we have 
passed, they believe that more regulation 
must be synonymous with more protection, 
and that more governmental scrutiny will 
make us safer and move us ever closer to 
the Holy Grail of zero risk. In addition, 
because of the lack of sound, objective, 
easily accessible information about the 
potential harmfulness of the regulatory 
status quo, they exhibit a kind of ‘rational 
apathy’, which simply means that in the 
absence of any obvious and proximate 
threat to their well-being — and of any 
likelihood that their actions will change the 
course of events — it is reasonable for them 
to remain unconcerned.
Another related phenomenon is that 
significant societal change seldom occurs 
except at times of crisis, when ideas have 
a greater likelihood of consequences. As 
Nobel Prize winner Milton Friedman 
and co-author Rose Friedman observe, 
in a kind of economist’s equivalent of the 
physical property of inertia, “once a tide 
in opinion or in affairs is strongly set, it 
tends to overwhelm counter-currents and 
to keep going for a long time in the same 
direction. The tides are capable of ignor-
ing geography, political labels, and other 
hindrances to their continuance.”21 But, the 
Friedmans continue, the very success of 
these tides “tends to create conditions that 
may ultimately reverse them.”
No matter how profound the economic 
and public health costs of over-regulation, 
and no matter how obvious and persuasive 
the arguments for regulatory reform, the 
fundamental changes needed to turn the tide 
will occur only if the public demands them.
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